Sharif al-Mujahid, a distinguished scholar and writer from Pakistan speaks to Media Voice about the current state of affairs in his country, especially after the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the US military in Abbottabad, and the radical Islamic movements in Pakistan.

Excerpts from the interview:
What is the general mood in Pakistan after the Abbottabad incident?

It is rather complex – bewilderment, shame, a general sense of insecurity, a huge dent in Pakistani military’s credibility and capability to defend Pakistan, to ensure Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty, and a further erosion of faith in Pakistan’s political leadership. Abbottabad occurred either because of intelligence failure or culpability. Intelligence failure is a lesser evil and Pakistan has no choice but to stick to (that explanation). That, of course, raises the question of Pakistan’s performance in such future ventures, which the Indian military command has already flaunted.

Pakistan has been in a state of turmoil for the past many years. What are the domestic reasons? And where does the country go from here?
Pakistan has been in turmoil only because of the Pakistan People’s Party government’s failure to deliver – especially on law and order; power-cuts for long hours even in cities like Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and others; bloated food prices since the floods; and an all-round breakdown; corruption at the top and lack of accountability; and the lavish lifestyle of rulers as against the rising poverty. No one can predict where we go from here.

How much influence does radical Islam have on mainstream Pakistani society, particularly in the backdrop of huge support for the assassin of Salman Taseer (the governor of the Punjab province, who was killed early this year allegedly for criticizing the country’s blasphemy law)?
Radical Islam doesn’t have much influence on mainstream Pakistan society, although (the society) does feel threatened because of their do-or-die attitude. Radical Islam is vocal, aggressive and has pockets of support but still has only a miniscule minority on its side. Some of the US policies are counter-productive and they feed into strengthening and augmenting that mindset.

Is the lack of a significant middle class the problem with Pakistan?
Lack of a significant middle class is, of course, the greatest problem with Pakistan and the mode of governance by various parties. Some people, including the rulers, are too rich and don’t care; they are actively engaged in amassing power and pelf all the time without caring for national welfare. About 40% are too poor and their major obsession is to get food and shelter, up to a subsistence level.

How do average Pakistanis view India’s rising economic profile and international influence?
With both admiration and suspicion – admiration at India’s rising economic profile and international weightage, and suspicion that it would eventually augment India’s hegemonic attitude. While Pakistan has jettisoned the partition syndrome and looks to the future, India is still stuck with it, and refuses to deal with Pakistan on terms of equality.

Is the two-nation theory alive? What is its relevance in Pakistan today? Do Pakistanis still think that they could not have lived together with Hindus in a united India?
The two-nation theory was a political construct, relevant to sub-continental India under British rule, designed to provide an intellectual justification and political ballast to carve out a consolidated Muslim India with sovereign rights and obligations in areas with Muslim majority. Partition radically changed the substratum variable (the field of work and the field of battle) in (French philosopher) Ernest Renan’s nationality framework since it was organically related to pre-partition colonial India. Hence the two-nation theory as such becomes irrelevant, as the two nations encapsulated in that theory had acquired full statehood and power. For Pakistanis, Pakistan meant to decimate the Hindu majoritarian attitude, and to (resist) being shoved to a minority or marginal status.